Purpose of this Blog

This website started as an outlet for students in Adriel M. Trott's Public Philosophy Senior Capstone course. It is now a website for sharing information about Wabash philosophy, studying philosophy in general and as an outlet for the Philosophy Club to engage.

Friday, February 7, 2014

Organized Sports: America's Academy


Philosophers have been thinking about the impact storytelling has on society since ancient Greece. Socrates famously outlines rules and reasons for a strict censorship in Plato’s Republic, and more recent philosophers such as Sartre employed playwriting as a way to explore philosophical concepts.
Today, many thinkers and writers are beginning to pay more attention to how our culture understands people of different genders and races through the stories we tell. It seems implicit that the movies we watch, or the video games we play, have some sort of impact on who we are as a community. Possibly the biggest fear of storytelling, as well as the biggest reason for censorship, is how it affects children. Like Socrates argues in The Republic, people often fear that allowing children to bare witness to bad behavior will increase the chances that the children will behave badly themselves.
While examining film and literature seems like a valuable way to understand and mold a given culture, it seems investigating America’s modern obsession with athletic competition can offer a similar type of knowledge. Socrates suggests that allowing children to watch good people do questionable things can potentially lead to confusion. If children see a good person do something bad, then they might think it is good to do bad things. The underlying assumption is that children form important and lasting opinions about how to behave at an early age. It follows, then, that we must be careful about what we teach them, about what we allow them to see.

But what, if anything, do America’s children learn from sports?

According to statistics gathered by usafootball.com, 7.6 million High School boys play football in America. So many people watch the Super Bowl each year that airing single commercial costs millions of dollars, and a single ticket to the game is worth thousands. It is hard to deny how popular sports are in America, but perhaps we should continue to think about how this continuously growing obsession is impacting our culture, particularly our youth.
To explore the life of one of the 7.6 million Americans currently playing High School football, we must begin at the age of eight. The third grade is a common time to begin playing football in America, although that age is diminishing. By the time a young athlete hits High School, playing football becomes something more like a full-time job. The season ends in the fall, sometime around Thanksgiving, if you make it to the championship. The pre-season, which typically consists of weight lifting, conditioning, and “student-lead” practices, begins in the spring. Practice continues throughout the summer, and some time in August almost every High School football team will begin practicing two times a day.
If a High School student wants to play two sports, say baseball and football, their schedule becomes even more intense. Travel baseball season begins as soon as High School baseball season ends. Each summer, two-sport athletes commonly find themselves balancing football practices with the roughly 100 baseball games they play as well.
This intense dedication doesn’t simply start in High School. To offer a personal example, I began playing travel baseball when I was 13 years old, and that was a year or two later than many of my friends. It is also important to note that this type of commitment is not only required of young men. Just like boys travel baseball, girl’s soccer and volleyball teams travel the country playing a multitude of games during the High School off-season with equal vigor.
Why are these trends significant? Having our youth dedicate so much time to athletics calls us to entertain an interesting conclusion: various sports and sport cultures are raising many of America’s children. Things become more interesting when we challenge this conclusion with a question raised earlier in this article. What do our children learn from dedicating so much effort and time to sports?
Just like with literature and film, this question becomes difficult to answer as soon as you begin. Because athletics now require so much time and dedication to succeed even at the lowest levels, athletes have begun “specializing” at young ages. This has allowed many of the most popular sports to develop their own unique cultures. Some parents and families spend their summers traveling the country to play baseball and others travel the country to play basketball. It seems to follow that a young boy might learn different things from playing baseball his whole life than if he had played basketball; he would have been surrounded by different people and immersed in a different game.
There are, however, some characteristics that apply to all sports in general. One of the more discussed and obvious examples is competition. In sports, there is a winner and a loser. Teams or individuals compete with the goal to win—the point of playing the game is to try and win the game. With this in mind, we can see how raising children to play sports means raising children to compete. Almost as soon as they are old enough to run, kids are signed up to begin competing against one another.
            The possible negative ramifications associated with raising our children to become over competitive have not gone unnoticed. Youth sport leagues now usually give out participation trophies of some sort to each player, regardless of whether or not their team won the championship that year. The term “ everyone gets a trophy these days” is a running joke amongst mothers and fathers in the stands of their children’s games. Our culture has already grown more sensitive to the often-ruthless nature of competitive sports, and many parents have begun taking measures to guard their children against harsh realities.  
The possible negative ramifications associated with raising our children to become over competitive have not gone unnoticed. Youth sport leagues now usually give out participation trophies of some sort to each player, regardless of whether or not their team won the championship that year. The term “ everyone gets a trophy these days” is a running joke amongst mothers and fathers in the stands of their children’s games. Our culture has already grown more sensitive to the often-ruthless nature of competitive sports, and many parents have begun taking measures to guard their children against harsh realities, but the debate continues. The New York Times ran an article titled “ Losing Is Good for You” this past fall, and many parents currently resent efforts to minimize competitive attitudes in youth sports.
          While discussions about our children being raised in an over competitive environment are happening around the country, the impact sports have on our culture reaches far beyond a single concern. The potential downsides to our fascination with athletic competition (e.g. extreme time commitments and pressure to succeed) shouldn’t be considered without remembering the positives as well. Sports teach our children how to struggle and compete to achieve a goal, and I suppose we live in a world where such skills are useful. Many of America’s best thinkers dedicate their time to exploring how the books we read impact the people we become, but perhaps we should focusing more of our efforts on examining something many children spend hours doing every day: playing organized sports.

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Conspiracy Theory and the Nutritive Art of Pedagogy


Whenever there exists an explanation, especially when it exists in service of complex subject matter, it seems that it doesn't stand alone, that other explanations stand as competition. This is especially true in the scientific community and its notion of parsimony--if one explanation has simpler implications for its encompassing scientific system, it will be accepted before one that challenges the relevant system. 

Parsimony seems logical, right? After all, we do tend to feel more satisfied with clear, colored-in-the-lines accounts. And, if we've gotten it all right so far, if it works, if it's operational, what worth would we derive from changing? "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," a modern-day proverb, sums up the issue, the inclination. But is this all to say that a dogmatic blanket is the ideal filter in every situation? It certainly appears to serve its purpose in the scientific realm. But does it?

Thomas Kuhn, philosophical physicist, had qualms with thinking of science as wholly comprised of such a blanket. Groundbreaking moments in the history of science have usually involved discoveries that defied the explanatory ability of the prevailing systems. Such discoveries shed light on rips in the fabric of a dogmatic blanket, rips large enough to reach through and feel out further boundaries.

This need not only apply to the world of lab-coats and research facilities, and I would like to make the case that it doesn't. In my undergraduate experience of discussion-based courses, answers to questions involving human relationships exist in the plural. Insights are broadly displayed, and sure, agreements are made, but multiplicity arises each and every time. The setup is simple and we can use any of the variety of instances when groups of humans interact to demonstrate it. But let's flash it up a bit! Let's talk about something weird. Let's talk about conspiracy theories.


Good ol' Dale Gribble from Mike Judge's animated sitcom King of the Hill never failed to develop an alternative theory for something gone wrong--a theory characterized by fault found with the federal government or some secret organization. His delivery was also always accompanied with an interesting duality of emotions: extreme paranoia with a dash of crippling anxiety. 

The philosophico-blogosphere isn't silent on the issue of conspiracy theories. JFK's assassination was topical last November 22nd, its 50th anniversary. Daniel Mullin's post over at the Unemployed Philosopher's Blog brings an interesting complaint against conspiracy theorists: if you're severely skeptical of the official account, what keeps you from calling out similar faults in the alternative theories you replace them with? True skepticism, Mullin holds, would demand that the skeptic be just as skeptical about alternative explanations or theories. 

There have been a lot of alternative theories proposed for why/how/if JFK was assassinated. But an event that evokes a similar response and is closer to public memory might be more appropriate for this discussion: 9/11. 

The philosophical community at large isn't silent on conspiracy theories either. Jodi Dean devotes a chapter to certainty and the modern day conspiracy theorist's interaction with 9/11 in her book, Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies. She uses psychoanalytic evaluation to paint a sociological picture of the psychotic and normal subjects. All of this to say that she claims that the conspiracy theorist rests in the former category, self-ostracized by the replacement of one significant understanding of the world with an alternative one. The psychotic subject can hardly even communicate among the normal subjects as a result of his replaced significance. 

But isn't this exactly the same sort of characteristic that qualifies for innovative science? The psychotic manifests itself in the scientist who encounters a groundbreaking discovery, one that Kuhn claimed could not be communicated by means of the prevailing scientific system. 

Dean continues to claim that the inability to communicate for psychotics is a problem fading away, thanks to communicative capitalism and the networks that similarly ostracized individuals can form with the use of social media and wide-spread information sharing. So now, not only do we have psychotic subjects, but we have psychotic communities. But I think it must be asserted that a call to caution is necessary among all of this description. After all, it does seem fairly compelling that the psychotic subject and the innovative scientist appear to match up.

So why is Dale Gribble so paranoid and anxious? At this point, I think it's fair to say that a conspiracy theorist is someone who maintains an alternative explanation for events that most people either neglect to consider or have nearly consensual explanations for. But when something ceases to be a conspiracy theory, like when the existence of an overarching, technological superpower was revealed, the NSA by name, the conspiracy theorist isn't liberated from his characterization as paranoid and anxious. Instead, the revelation makes the theory commonplace and resets the psychotic-normal relationship. The next person who holds an alternative explanation that doesn't at all align with the normal subject's understanding will be characterized like this:

even if he shows us something like this, or this.

This is where discussion of pedagogy becomes most pressing and worthwhile. We have to find interest in the methods of teaching. Just as we cannot instruct science students in how to make groundbreaking discoveries to test the dogmatic blanket, we cannot expect to be able to teach other students how to push the dogmatic blanket in fields like ethics, epistemology, logic, or aesthetics. But this doesn't put us at a complete loss. If my studies in philosophy have taught me anything so far, it would be unwise of me to ignore this obvious statement: the routes for approaching explanation are vast and number in quantities off-scale. 

No work would get done in scientific communities if nothing was taken for truth, to be built-upon, or as Kuhn says, to be "mopped up." But conversely, attachment to truth taken-for-granted sustains an ignorance of the tears in the dogmatic blanket. Skepticism of an official account, or any truth taken for granted should not be characterized by a shivering Dale Gribble or the bumbling, alcoholic father and farmer from Independence Day (although he did turn out to be right, after all!). 

Pedagogical methodology has to open itself up for internal discourses, critiques of the taken-for-granteds. This does not mean that classrooms should be overruled by "What if we're all, like, wrong about, like everything?" This only means that legitimate source-checking demands constant suspicion. When a graduate student composes a dissertation, I imagine that anxiety and paranoia take over when hoping that a source wasn't mis-cited or missing all together. Does this mean that she ought not to be meticulously tuned in to a heavy focus or worse, that we should hope to avoid such strenuous fact-checking because of the paranoia and anxiety associated with it?

Pedagogy has a real opportunity here to nurture and provide sustained conversations without the snapping elastic re-bound of the normal subject. And we have a lot to learn from conspiracy theories.

Friday, January 31, 2014

Philosophy and the Habits of Conversation


I've been thinking lately about why it is difficult for people to confront and reconsider their views about the world.  Plato depicts a Socrates who confronted this problem when he encountered sophists who were less intent on exploring together with Socrates what the truth might be and more intent on using logic and rhetoric to support positions they already held.  The difference seems to be between elenchus, where we let the logos have an effect on how we think, and eristic, where we defend what we already think for the sake of winning.  Again and again, Plato shows us a Socrates who leads his interlocutor to the brink of an insight that the interlocutor's position cannot be defended, and again and again, the interlocutor walks away continuing down the same road he had begun when he started the conversation with Socrates.  The problem of using our reason to support positions we already hold rather than following the logos to see what position or insight it will lead us to remains at work in American politics, where most Americans watch news sources they already agree with.  Perhaps some have done the careful work of thinking about why they agree with those sources and are now moving from that position, but the numbers make us wonder whether people are only looking for ways to support the views they already hold rather than to examine them. Plato has Socrates raise this question in the Republic, where Socrates and Adiemantus look at the philosophical nature that is corrupted and is used for the advantage of others.  Such a character ceases to strive after knowing what is true and good and only uses her techniques as tools to support the views of those by whom she is employed.  

What then would it take to develop a character that was willing to think differently, to encounter ideas in a way that allows them to change our minds under real consideration rather than with a predisposition to reject certain positions and accept only those we already agree with?  Aristotle might be a helpful guide here because Aristotle thinks of character in two important ways that bear on this conversation: as cultivated through habit and as affected by emotion.  One thing that seems to keep us from having genuine conversation, where that means a willingness to reconsider our own position, is the emotional response that makes us defensive when we encounter a position that we have been cultivated to reject.  For Aristotle, what we habituate when we habituate ourselves to live virtuously is our affective life, the way that we feel.  So if we can habituate ourselves to empathize with other positions, to stand in someone else's position, to suppose that there might be real reasons and forceful ideas behind another person's perspective, we might possibly become interlocutors who don't just use the logos as a weapon to justify ourselves and thus keep it from ever really considering our commitments, as Nicias does in the Laches.  Of course, this is not easy because it means that we have to let go of being right - another Socratic commitment - and we have to practice having conversation differently than we have up to this point been habituated talk to one another.  But what might come from this change would be the possibility of real conversation with people we disagree with over issues that matter.   Be careful.  You might have to change.  

Monday, January 20, 2014

Philosophy in the Public Square

Since its early days, philosophy has found itself in a complicated and often fraught relationship with public life. In Plato's Apology, Plato has Socrates challenge the leaders of Athens to see that they do not know what they think they know and they accuse him of impiety and corrupting the youth. In defense, Socrates argues that he alone cares for the city and its youth. In response, the Athenians convict and execute him. Decades later, when Aristotle is in danger of being tried by the Athenians, he goes into exile saying, as the story goes, that he wanted to prevent Athens from sinning against philosophy twice. Aristotle himself becomes the tutor to the future emperor, Alexander the Great. Plato went to the court of Dion of Syracuse of advise him and Plato's Seventh Letter is addressed to him. Plato's Republic seems to show that the entire city needs to be reorganized to be run by the philosopher if the city is to be safe for philosophers. But perhaps the question is also how to make the city safe from philosophers. Hannah Arendt suggests in her article, Philosophy and Politics, that the reason philosophy and politics are at odds is that philosophy is the place for the concern with truth, while politics is the site of doxa, or appearances.  Plato, she argues, tries to bring order to the city by placing truth above doxa or opinion, but really, we are all still, as embodied beings within doxa, seeing only our point of view and building that position with the addition of the multiple points of view that a city brings.  For Arendt, the multiplicity of the city makes us better able to see what is since each of us by ourselves may only bring a part, our own view of how the world appears. So if even the philosopher sees only what appears to her, what then is the importance, relevance and possibility of bringing philosophy to the public square?
In the first half of the Spring semester 2014, the senior philosophy majors at Wabash will think through this question by reading the efforts of other philosophy bloggers and creating their own blogposts that bring philosophy into the public sphere. Stay tuned!